RUSSIA: 'Bears & Blackjacks'

It was like the clock had been turned back 25 years. In August this year two RAF Tornado aircraft were in the air, scrambled to intercept a TU-95MS ‘Bear’ patrol northwest of the Outer Hebrides. On the other side of the globe USAF pilots ‘exchange smiles’ with their Russian counterparts near the island of Guam. The Russian press televise footage of President Vladimir Putin clambering aboard a TU-160 ‘Blackjack’ bomber to take to the air and witness first hand the bomber exercise from the cockpit.

If this was just part of a general military exercise then the events could be easily explained. But it was not. On 17 August 2007 Putin made the following announcement at the General Forces Training Ground 225, Chebarkul, where the Peace Mission 2007 Counter terrorism Exercises with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) had just finished.

In 1992, the Russian Federation unilaterally stopped sending its strategic aviation on long-range patrols. Unfortunately, not everyone has followed our example and other countries’ strategic aviation continues patrols to this day. This creates certain problems for the Russian Federation in ensuring its security.
In response to this situation, I have decided that Russia’s strategic aviation will resume patrols on a permanent basis. At midnight, today, August 17, 14 strategic missile-carriers, support and refuelling aircraft took off from seven air force bases in different parts of the Russian Federation and began a patrol involving a total of 20 aircraft. As from today, such patrols will be carried out on a regular basis. These patrols are strategic in nature. The aircraft involved in today’s patrol will spend around 20 hours in the air, with refuelling, in coordination with the Navy.
The patrols will take place above all in areas where Russian Federation shipping and economic activity is most active.
We hope that our partners will show understanding towards the resumption of patrols by Russia’s strategic aviation.
Our pilots have spent too long on the ground. We have strategic aviation but it spends practically no time in the air. Flights took place now and again only during large-scale military exercises, and as you know, we have held very few such exercises over the last 15 years. As I said, our pilots have spent too long on the ground. I know that they are happy to now have this chance to begin a new life and we wish them luck. Source

US DOD reaction in public was minimal. General Sherlock stated, 'militaries all over the world conduct a variety of operations. This is not something new.’ Source But this is a notable development in Russian military activity. Should the US and EU be concerned? Why have the patrols resumed and what are the implications?

Foreign, rather than defence ministries should take more note. Militarily the patrols are not a serious issue. The patrols respect the air space of the nearest states and do not pose an immediate threat to western territorial integrity. The Pentagon is not about to go into crisis mode. But foreign ministries should certainly sit up and take note. This is a message – a signal to western governments that Russia’s interests are not to be ignored when pursuing their own international objectives. Using the phrase of Stephen Cimbala, Putin is playing international politics by ‘military persuasion’. (see Stephen J. Cimbala, Russia and Armed Persuasion (Rowman and Littlefield: Maryland, 2001)

The resumption of the patrols illustrates a wider Kremlin strategy to pursue its political interests: to exert its own diplomatic influence to temper the West’s activities through ‘non lethal’ military persuasive means. One such method is through changes in military doctrine and military manoeuvres. Russia is not about to directly challenge the west in military terms but this latest development does indicate a wider plan.

What are Russia’s international political objectives? Combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are primary interests but so is the perceived need to counter US (including NATO) power in the international system. At present Russia is resurgent; recovered from the political and socio-economic disasters of the first post cold war decade, fuelled quite literally by its expanding natural energy resources, and seeks a multi-polar state system not dominated by the US. US hegemony is not about to end overnight, but Putin knows that it is in Russia’s national interest to check American power where it can. Most importantly it wants to keep the US and NATO from tiptoeing around Russia’s backyard – the former Soviet states or its ‘near abroad’. The eastward expansion of NATO and the proposed European arm of the US national missile defence shield is a bitter issue. In an interview on the 16 October 2007 with Iranian State Television, Putin stated that the Kremlin views continued NATO expansion as ‘very negative’.

‘It is our view that today’s threats and chief among them is international terrorism, cannot be dealt with by expanding a military political organisation that was originally set up to counteract the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. There is no Soviet Union and no Warsaw Pact today, while NATO not only exists but is expanding… We are particularly concerned about military infrastructure coming closer to our borders.’ Source

Combine this with pro western democratic movements in Ukraine, Georgia (both aspiring NATO members along with the Baltic Republics) and to a lesser extent Kyrgyzstan, with the stationing of US armed units in Central Asia, supposedly supporting the war on terror, and you have an extremely unpalatable situation. To face these challenges, the Russian armed forces are deemed by Moscow to be a particularly effective instrument to advance its foreign policy and diplomacy.


Time to get tough
Changes in military doctrine as a means of military persuasion came shortly after the NATO campaign over Kosovo and Serbia. The direct and successful military intervention in a state with close ties to Russia rattled the political and military establishment in Moscow. This was an ominous portent of how far Russian power had diminished. NATO, with its plans of expansion had grown as a problem. Military circles perceived the real threat, or actual use, of armed force against Russian territory or forces in its near abroad. In reaction two events happened. In April 1999 the Security Council met to discuss and revise the nuclear strategy outlined in the 1997 national Security Concept. On 10 January 2000, Putin signed the new Concept. The main shift in nuclear strategy lay with the use of nuclear weapons in a limited conflict, rather than solely for deterrence of a large-scale attack against Russian territory. It essentially expanded the conflict scenarios in which nuclear weapons could be used, detailing global, regional and local war, most worryingly, ‘armed conflict, primarily ethnic and religious in origin, waged inside the country’ where ‘other states might be involved indirectly’ Furthermore the core plant of Soviet nuclear doctrine has been removed – that of no first use. And even the concept of first use is vague. For example since the Military Doctrine of 1993, an attack on Russian territory, armed forces or allies has been expanded to threats against military security and ‘international stability and peace’. This is a direct message to the west: get involved in our conflicts and the consequences could potentially be devastating. Source

War Games
Policy papers are one thing, but what turns military doctrine into reality, short of war, is through military manoeuvres. Military exercises can tell the observer many things, mainly what type of conflict scenario the state is preparing for. In Russia, except for the 2007 exercises involving counter-terrorist operations with SCO, exercises have indicated a conflict with NATO and the US. They have all been defensive scenarios but the majority have involved the simulated launch of nuclear weapons. Zapad 99 (West 99), shortly after the Kosovo campaign, witnessed an ‘attack’ by NATO on Belarus and the Kaliningrad oblast. Once conventional forces were unable to repel the assault, the simulation of a nuclear strike by Russian forces was initiated. There were 2 key indicators. First strategic bombers, using a tactic called “around the corner” launched the nuclear strike. Four aircraft turned the corner around the northern tip of Norway into the north Atlantic. They then separated with two ‘launching’ air launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) against continental US and the other two against targets in Europe. This flight path and tactic is now being routinely run on a permanent basis by strategic air forces, not just on an ad hoc basis. Secondly despite strong official statements to the contrary at the time of Zapad 99, Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev admitted that the objective of the exercise was to test this new doctrine against an NATO attack on Russia. It was similar in size and scale of the Kosovo campaign and the use nuclear weapons against western targets following the exhaustion of convention forces. General Baluyevski, deputy chief of the General Staff, stated that not only the aggressor states, but also any state whose territory was being used by the aggressor, would be targeted. This comment, made over 8 years ago, is even more relevant today considering the proposed basing of missile defences in Poland and the Czech Republic. Source

Subsequent exercises have held a similar pattern in both scope and desired political and military impact. Between the summer of 1999 and February 2004, there have been 14 exercises of varying, size, type and scope. According to Dr Nikolai Sokov, all simulated regional type conflicts and against state(s) possessing nuclear weapons and the majority appeared to simulate limited nuclear strikes. The main means of limited nuclear delivery was the medium and heavy bomber. ‘Strategic command and staff training’ exercises in February 2001 witnessed simulated ALCM launches against Japan, supposedly following US and Chinese confrontation over Taiwan. In September 2001, plans were initiated for air units to try and break through the air defences of NATO and NORAD through the Arctic Circle. These were called off following the 9/11 attacks. In May 2003 Russia conducted manoeuvres in the Indian Ocean with India, despite the war in Iraq. Bombers launched nuclear capable cruise missiles in the Arabian Sea and ‘attacks’ were made against Diego Garcia and naval units. While these exercises would have been planned before Operation Iraqi Freedom started, the decision to so blatantly continue them was undoubtedly a clear signal to the US: Russia is still a military power and cannot be ignored. Source

In regard to the reinstatement of permanent strategic missile carrying bomber patrols, a pattern clearly emerges when analysed in the context of Russian military doctrine and manoeuvres. The planes symbolize a move from exercises to operations. And they are delivering a message. To paraphrase Clausewitz, the patrols are a continuation of political objectives through military, albeit non-lethal, means. They are a means to enforce Russian objectives in competition with the West. As long as Western foreign policy runs counter to that of the Kremlin, the use of the military as a tool of diplomatic influence will certainly escalate.